The storm over the blind activist Chen Guangcheng has understandably captured the world’s attention in the past week. But an event of much greater significance remains the ouster of Bo Xilai, the powerful party boss of Chongqing. The rise and fall of Bo is part of a much larger and potentially disruptive trend in China–the return of politics to the Chinese Communist Party.

We don’t much think of the party as a political organization these days. It is dominated by technocrats obsessed with economic and engineering challenges. These men–and they are almost all men–are comfortable talking about detailed economic and technical data, but they are not skilled politicians, adept at handling large crowds or palace intrigue. This apolitical system is a recent phenomenon and the outcome of a conscious decision by the founder of modern China, Deng Xiaoping.

When the Chinese communists took power in 1949, the party was dominated by charismatic revolutionaries and military leaders. Court politics, intrigue, ideological posturing and mass politics were pervasive in the new regime, and its leader, Mao Zedong, was a master politician. In 1957 he launched the "antirightist campaign," which was followed by the Great Leap Forward, which was followed by the Cultural Revolution, all designed to divide and destroy his opponents and consolidate his power.

Mao also kept his lieutenants in constant turmoil. Just before the Cultural Revolution, Beijing published a list of the 26 top officials in China. Two years later, only 13 remained in office, the others having been purged. Defense Minister Lin Biao, once designated as Mao’s successor, tried to flee the country and was killed. Hyperpolitics persisted after Mao’s death. The new head of the party ordered the arrest of the radical Gang of Four, who were said to have been perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution. They were tried, convicted and imprisoned.

It was against this backdrop that Deng took power in the late 1970s and 1980s. Deng was determined to end the high drama of Chinese political life and focus on economic development. He wanted to turn the party into a professional organization run by technocrats, mostly engineers. He required them to have been top students who subsequently showed skill in practical problem solving. He even changed the tone of party meetings, which had been devoted to long-winded ideological speeches, saying in 1980, "If you don’t have anything to say, save your breath … The only reason to hold meetings and to speak at them is to solve problems."

The party was soon transformed. By 1985, the Central Committee was dominated by younger college graduates and the Politburo’s Standing Committee, the country’s ruling elite, were all engineers. That tradition of technocracy has persisted. A party whose history is tied to peasants, workers and soldiers is now the most elitist operation in the world. Its system of promotion favors engineers, economists and management experts over anyone with grassroots political skills. For two decades, China has been run like a company, not a country.

Eventually, politics had to re-emerge. China has reached a level of growth and development at which the big questions it faces are not technical engineering puzzles but deep political, philosophical ones.

Bo represented the revival of politics in at least two ways. In a system of colorless men, he was charismatic, conniving and political. He was comfortable in front of crowds, eager to push himself forward, and he rubbed against the grain of consensus decisionmaking. Money was, as in U.S. politics, the grease that smoothed Bo’s rise. But he also represented the "new left," an ideological movement that emphasized social and cultural solidarity, the power of the state and other populist issues. Whether he truly believed in these stances is irrelevant. Like all good political entrepreneurs, he saw a market for these ideas in modern China and filled it. And there are other would-be leaders–military nationalists, economic liberals, even more-full-throated populists–who are debating China’s future furiously, though privately, in Beijing and Shanghai.

Bo’s ouster is the most significant purge in the party’s top ranks since Tiananmen Square. The party may hope that the People’s Republic, as it did after that earlier upheaval, can return to its efficient and steady technocratic path. But China has changed too much. And politics in China is xenophobic, populist, nationalist, messy and certainly unpredictable–like politics everywhere.

FOR MORE BY FAREED ZAKARIA, GO TO time.com/zakaria

The United States and China are meeting this week to talk about military and economic policy, but the headlines leading up to the talks have not been encouraging. Visiting the Philippines during a clash in the South China Sea, top American officials reaffirmed the alliance with Manila. And a Chinese activist escaped house arrest and briefly took shelter at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, after which China demanded an apology from the U.S.

Do these clashes point to a larger conflict? Are the U.S. and China headed toward a cold war?

» Read more

LONDON — Meet Ma Jian (Photo): Chinese novelist-in-exile and apparently the designated explainer of Chinese literature for foreign observers. For years now Ma Jian has provided Western journalists with a firm moral footing from which to consider the hazy issue of freedom of speech in China.

Ma Jian speaks in familiar terms of courage, conscience and integrity, accusing writers within China of cowardice. In a 2008 article for The New York Times, he wrote that “they refuse to admit their complicity with the repressive political system.” He appeared most recently, in mid-April, in the media flurry surrounding the London Book Fair, during which the choice of China as this year’s “Market Focus” country was described as “importing censorship” and the Chinese writers in the official delegation were decried as party hacks.

Commenters have borrowed Ma Jian in writing vigorous — sometimes caustic — attacks on the Chinese government. And even those inclined to feel sympathy toward Chinese authors seem disappointed that they’re not pushing harder. Everyone seems to be waiting for the writers to speak with the kind of courage and moral clarity displayed by political dissidents like Liu Xiaobo and Chen Guangcheng. What’s holding them back? Asked directly, most will say that they have perfect freedom to write but imperfect freedom to publish — namely, that self-censorship is not an issue.

I don’t believe this for an instant.

Since 2005 or so I’ve worked as a translator and promoter of Chinese literature, and — to borrow the grand language of the London Book Fair — I’ve generally adopted a “strategy of engagement” toward Chinese writers. What this means is that for several years I tried coaxing writers into confessing to me how oppressed they felt, perhaps with the aim of encouraging them to buck up somehow.

This went over poorly. While a few agreed boisterously with my arguments, usually over beer or baijiu, most just squinted at me or let their eyes wander, then changed the subject. Others, even though I was sure they shared my point of view, would lean back and smile Sphinx-like at the ceiling. Eventually I embarrassed myself enough to give it up.

Over time, I’ve come to think it isn’t courage that Chinese writers lack. From 1949 to 1989, the first 40 years of the modern Chinese state, plenty of them spoke their minds and suffered for it. Post-1989, however, the government has made it very clear that writers (along with most of civil society) were no longer welcome to participate directly in resolving the Grand Questions of the Nation. Literature was pushed back into what might be considered its traditional role: not to launch polemics against specific injustices, but to come at problems obliquely — feeling for root causes, working in metaphor. It’s an approach more conducive to understanding than condemnation, more apt to sorrow than outrage and more likely to lead inward than outward.

This inward movement seems to have proved corrosive. The writers of the 1950s and 1960s may have been persecuted politically, but the last three decades are littered with examples of incisive authors who persecuted themselves. Wang Xiaobo died of a heart attack at the age of 45. Wang Shuo descended into dissipation. Gouzi turned to the bottle. Zhu Wen stopped writing altogether.

Yan Lianke is the rare Chinese author who is exerting all his powers to illustrate the illnesses of Chinese society while himself remaining a part of it. His portrait of AIDS villages in Henan is just as damning of the stricken villagers as it is of the officials who preyed on them. The stress visible in his face, however, is caused by something more than just tackling politically sensitive subjects. It is the result of pushing into territory where almost no one — not readers, not censors, not even other writers — wants him to go.

And why not? Perhaps it has to do with shame — shame of a specific historical kind. After a century of humiliation at the hands of outsiders, China finally regained self-determination in 1949, only to almost immediately plunge itself into a 30-year nightmare that caused more deaths and damage than anything ever inflicted by foreigners. The trauma of that period has been deeply buried, particularly since 1989. The collective belief that the Chinese people’s relationship to their government today is somehow normal — that the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were simply the growing pains of a new nation — might be the defining fiction of modern Chinese society.

Call it shame, call it mass Stockholm Syndrome, but this cognitive dissonance appears to be a far more potent poison than mere censorship. Whether or not I’m right about this, it’s not a conversation Chinese writers are prepared to enter into.

Eric Abrahamsen is a literary translator and publishing consultant.

HONG KONG - In an apparent effort to minimize the political shocks from the dismissal of Chongqing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretary Bo Xilai and rampant speculation of what he had done wrong, the CCP is now trying to play down the incident as an isolated "criminal case".

This strongly indicates that Beijing does not want the removal of Bo, also one of the 25 powerful politburo members, to escalate into an internal political struggle that could destabilize the transition of power at the 18th party congress later this year.

Hence, there is unlikely to be a massive political purge in the party and the government following Bo’s fall. Officials who are not implicated in Bo’s alleged criminal offences - amid rumors surrounding the murder of British citizen Neil Heywood and corruption - are unlikely to be affected.

Bo was dismissed as Chongqing party secretary on March 15 - one day after Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao publicly held the Chongqing party committee and the government accountable for the incident of former Chongqing police chief and Bo’s right-hand man Wang Lijun’s "unauthorized entry" into the US Consulate General in Chengdu on February 6.

Apparently acting on information provided by Wang during an investigation, the CCP power center announced on April 10 the suspension of Bo’s memberships in the CCP politburo and central committee for "serious violations of discipline", pending further investigation. It was also announced that Bo’s wife Gu Kailai and an orderly at their home were suspects in the murder of Heywood in Chongqing in November 2011.

To be fair, reinvestigation into a homicide case half a year earlier does take time, particularly in the case of Heywood, whose remains were reportedly immediately cremated. Hence it is not unusual that Chinese authorities since then have kept mute on the case.

This, however, leaves room for the overseas media to speculate (China’s state-run media are strictly banned from carrying any unauthorized reports). Some said Gu was Heywood’s one-time lover. Some said Heywood had a grudge with Gu over some business disputes. Some said it was Bo who personally ordered the murder of Heywood because the latter held information that could jeopardize Bo’s political career.

The CCP can ignore such fiction-like reports, but it has to take seriously rumors and unconfirmed reports suggesting Bo’s removal is a result of a political struggle in the party and that officials sympathizing or supporting him would be purged. It is evident that after the short-lived spread of rumors on the Internet about a military coup in Beijing in mid-March, Chinese police have closed down over a dozen websites and detained people suspected of starting the rumors.

But this has failed to scare off overseas media who continue to speculate about a political struggle inside the CCP triggered by Bo’s purge.

Although Zhou Yongkang, one of the nine members of the politburo standing committee at the center of the military-coup rumor, has made frequent public appearances ever since, some recent reports in the Hong Kong media still insist that he is a political supporter of Bo and will be disgraced.

There have also been reports that several dozen officials in Chongqing and in Dalian, where Bo used to work as mayor, have been arrested for investigation. Other reports said some People’s Liberation Army (PLA) generals close to Bo have "disappeared" or "being under investigation". There were even reports that the CCP may have to postpone its 18th congress in October to deal with the political shock caused by Bo’s dismissal.

At home, the new leftists, who oppose capitalist-style reform and opening up and advocate a return to some sort of socialism, have also tried to characterize Bo’s dismissal as a political purge. For instance, Kong Qingdong, a Peking University professor and a die-hard new leftist, immediately renounced the dismissal as a "counter-revolutionary coup". Another new leftist Sima Nan called it the "darkest day" in contemporary China. After Beijing announced an investigation into Bo, the new leftists demanded a "public trial" to let the public make a judgment.

For the CCP, political and social stability is crucial for smooth power transition at the 18th Party Congress later this year (it is unlikely it would be put off - that would only cause greater political uncertainty). It cannot sit idle and allow talk about a political struggle to run wild.

Hence, last week the state-run Xinhua News Agency dispatched three editorials in three consecutive days to dismiss Bo’s purge as being one of "political struggle". The editorials were all in English, apparently targeting at overseas readers.

The editorial on April 16 said:

The Bo Xilai investigation is a case that the Communist Party of China (CPC) has handled according to Party regulation and discipline, reflecting the Party’s resolution to strictly govern itself. It does not indicate a political struggle within the Party.

Prior to Bo, there were also members of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau who were investigated and punished for discipline violations, including Chen Xitong, former secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of CPC and Chen Liangyu, former secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of CPC.

The way in which these cases were handled safeguarded the dignity of Party discipline and law, won resolute support from the people and were conducive to China’s healthy development.

By likening Bo’s purge to the two Chens’, it implies there is unlikely a political purge of other officials not implicated in the "criminal case". Both Chens were dealt with as individual "corruption cases" with no political purges.

The editorial on the next day said:

Based on the facts made public so far, the Wang Lijun incident is a serious political event that has created an adverse influence both at home and abroad, the death of Neil Heywood is a serious criminal case involving the kin and aides of a Party and state leader, and Bo has seriously violated Party discipline.

Observers have stated that the handling of related events has demonstrated the Party’s willingness to strictly enforce Party discipline and law, as well as improve supervision of leading officials.
…
No one should leave it to chance that they can take advantage of power to seek personal gain without being punished. In this sense, the investigation into Bo’s disciplinary violations can be interpreted as a move to better supervise the use of power.

The last editorial, on April 18, has a straightforward title: "Criminal Case Shall Not Be Interpreted As Political Struggle". It said:

Chinese central authorities and relevant departments have paid great attention to the death of British national Neil Heywood, and police have set up a team to reinvestigate the case according to law and seek truth from facts. …

Reinvestigation results show that the existing evidence indicates that Heywood died of homicide, of which Bo Gu Kailai and Zhang Xiaojun (the orderly at Bo’s home) are highly suspected.

… Heywood’s case is a criminal case and is being handled according to law, as it would be in any other country under the rule of law.
…
The homicide was alleged by former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun who entered, without authorization, the US. general consulate in Chengdu on Feb 6.

After the death of Heywood and the Wang Lijun incident, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) decided to investigate Bo Xilai for serious discipline violations.
…
The Wang Lijun incident, the death of Heywood and Bo’s discipline violations have had an extremely negative impact. The timely and proper decision by the CPC Central Committee to investigate the case safeguards the sanctity of law and reflects the firm resolution of the CPC Central Committee to adhere to the rule of law.

The criminal case shall not be interpreted as a political struggle. China’s development will not be hindered by these separate incidents, and the overall state of the country will not be affected by human influence. …
It will be better for those who are viewing the situation with a certain amount of bias to wait it out, as the truth of the matter will come out after the investigation is completed.

Clearly, Xinhua is authorized to dispatch these editorials to explain the CCP’s position on dealing with Bo’s case. They deliver a strong message that the party does not want to escalate Bo’s dismissal into a political purge of officials who used to support Bo or work closely with him. A good example is Chongqing mayor Huang Qifan, who has worked closely with Bo in past four years to create the "Chongqing Model" and whose capability Bo appreciated very much.

As such, Huang would have been a major target had there been a political purge. But Huang still remains in office after Bo’s removal. Some senior officials and PLA generals rumored to be in trouble have also made their public appearances recently. The People’s Daily, the CCP’s flagship newspaper, played down Bo’s role in Chongqing’s development, saying "achievements in Chongqing have been made collectively". Its sister publication Global Times further said on April 19 that "any individual’s influence [in Chongqing[ should not be over-estimated".

It may be also naive to think Bo’s former political "allies" would continue to support him after his removal unless they want to commit political suicide. After all in politics, there is no such thing as genuine "friendship" - only interests are permanent.

But "no power struggle" does not mean there is no political maneuvering. Bo had been tipped to be promoted into the Politburo Standing Committee at the 18th party congress. His fall now leaves a vacancy for other possible candidates to compete. The jockeying is going on in calm waters. It is also certain that while there is no political purge, that political future of those who are deemed to be too close to Bo won’t be so bright.

Notes
1. China’s development not to be hindered by individual incidents, Xinhua, Apr 16, 2012.
2. Bo investigation warns officials of power abuse, Xinhua, Apr 17, 2012.
3. Criminal case shall not be interpreted as political struggle, Xinhua, Apr 18, 2012.

(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.

In a recent survey of nearly 6,000 high-income, college-educated individuals in 25 countries, the Edelman Trust Barometer found that 43% trusted government institutions. In the United States that figure was 45%, while in China it was 75%. The fact that more of the "informed public" in China trust government than in the United States may seem puzzling.

America has a constitution that limits the power of government and protects individual rights; China has no genuine rule of law, a one-party state, and weak or nonexistent protection of human rights. How can successful people in China have greater trust in government than those in America?

The answer is simple: in China the surest path to riches is through power; in America it is through freedom. The all-encompassing hold on political power by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its control of the commanding heights of the economy mean that those who hold power are privileged in the race to the top of the economic ladder. Even with more than three decades of economic reform, political reform has seriously lagged.

There is no independent judiciary to safeguard rights to life, liberty, and property. State-owned banks lend to state-owned enterprises, all of which are run by the party elite. Asking the "princelings" if they trust government is like asking children if they like candy. If the Edelman Trust Barometer had asked ordinary Chinese whether they trusted government institutions, their answer, if they were free to express themselves, would be an emphatic "no!"

There are some independent thinkers in China who recognize that the inequality of wealth is due to the inequality of power. As long as the CCP holds a monopoly on power, economic life will be politicized and corruption will be pervasive. Deng Xiaoping was willing to allow people to get rich and began to move China toward greater economic freedom in 1978, but there has not been sufficient progress on limiting the power of government.

China’s dilemma is that if the CCP wants to improve the quality of life, it must allow greater freedom of choice, but that will threaten its monopoly on power - thus the struggle between power and freedom. Ai Weiwei, perhaps China’s most famous dissident, aptly notes, "In a society like this there is no negotiation, no discussion, except to tell you that power can crush you."

What China needs most is not democracy but limited government and the rule of law. That is why Mao Yushi founded The Unirule Institute of Economics in Beijing in 1993, to promote what Nobel Laureate economist F. A. Hayek called "the constitution of liberty." On May 4, Mao will be the first Chinese scholar to receive the prestigious Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty, awarded every two years by the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. (It is uncertain whether he will be allowed to attend.)

Like Lao Tzu, China’s first liberal, Mao Yushi understands that harmony - both social and economic - emerges from freedom under just rules, not from orders from above. Lao Tzu wisely counseled, "When the government is too intrusive, people lose their spirit. Act for the people’s benefit. Trust them; leave them alone."

The principle of wu wei (nonintervention) recognizes that people should be free to choose and be held accountable. With free private markets - in resources, goods, and ideas - mistakes tend to be corrected more rapidly than under central planning, minimizing the risk of large errors. As such, the quality of life tends to improve continuously.

Since rights to life, liberty, and property reside in individuals and the legitimate function of government is to protect those rights, a just government depends on the trust of the people. Even an emperor can lose the "mandate of heaven" if he violates that trust.
Mao Yushi has had the courage to criticize the morality of the Chinese legal system and to question the legacy of Mao Zedong, saying that Mao was not a god and he should be held accountable for the deaths of tens of millions of people during the Great Famine (1958-61) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).

Premier Wen Jiabao has called for political reform and further economic liberalization, but under his leadership little progress has occurred. His rebuke and purging of Bo Xilai, former party chief of Chongqing, reveals a growing struggle for power between liberals and hardliners. In 2010, Xi Jinping, who is expected to become China’s next president later this year, congratulated Bo for his "Red Culture Campaign" designed to stir up popular support for the so-called Chongqing model of development. That model is more state-led than market-led, and the effects of corruption are now becoming evident.

State capitalism is consistent with the party’s power but not with the quest for a "harmonious society." Top-down planning requires obedience; freedom is seen as dangerous. China needs spontaneous harmony, not forced harmony. In China, the wealthy class is largely the privileged political class-and with a single powerful party one either gets in line or tries to exit the country.

The attempt to exit China’s "big government, small market" system is seen in the increase in visa applications by wealthy Chinese: from 2007 to 2011, the number of applications for investment immigration visas to the United States grew by 1,000 %. Those who can afford to invest at least $1 million in the United States want to leave China because they are uncertain about the future, especially the security of their assets due to government corruption and the lack of a transparent legal system that protects property rights. They also want their children to be independent thinkers. One entrepreneur simply says, "The problem is that government power is too great."

Being skeptical of big government is the right attitude. The US constitution was designed to limit the size and scope of government and to allow people to pursue their own happiness under a just system of law. "The sum of good government," wrote Thomas Jefferson, is "a wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned."

The United States could best teach China by adhering to the principles of a liberal order that rests on non-intervention and freedom under the law of the constitution. The challenge for both China and America is to recognize that rights reside in the people, that those rights are not positive welfare rights - to "do good" with other people’s money - but equal rights to be left alone to pursue happiness.

The right balance between freedom and power is the test of good government. Without the free flow of ideas and competition, the voices of the Chinese people will be lost, and exit will be difficult but attractive.

James A Dorn is a China specialist at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC and editor of China in the New Millennium.

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing. Articles submitted for this section allow our readers to express their opinions and do not necessarily meet the same editorial standards of Asia Times Online’s regular contributors.

(Copyright 2012 James A Dorn.)

Remarks by Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari to the Council on Foreign Relations Washington, DC, April 23, 2012

You know that I have been leading the Tibetan delegation for the dialogue with the Chinese government for the last many years. But I am not here today to give you a report on my progress because there is nothing new to say on that front. My last meeting with my counterparts in Beijing was in January 2010. Ever since, despite sincere and serious efforts on my part, we have been unable to reconvene. With the very critical situation in Tibet, the leadership changes both in Beijing and Dharamsala, and due to some other factors, I do not see any prospect for an early resumption, at least under my watch. However, having spent decades on this effort, I still do passionately believe that ultimately the only way for the Tibetans and Chinese to find a mutually acceptable solution for Tibet is through dialogue. I hope therefore that farsighted thinking and a resurgence of political will can prevail over intransigence among China’s leaders, and I am pleased that the democratically-elected Tibetan leader Dr. Lobsang Sangay the Kalon Tripa (Chairman of the Cabinet) has repeatedly expressed a strong continuing commitment to pursue the Middle Way approach initiated by His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

Every struggle is unique. In the case of the Tibetan struggle, its uniqueness is derived from the nature of the Tibetan people, the Tibetan Buddhist culture, and the deep historical and personal bond between the Tibetans and His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

Even after he devolved his political authority to an elected leadership in 2011, the Dalai Lama’s world view — shaped by the extraordinary, sometimes tragic experiences of his life; the scores of world leaders, including Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Mao Zedong and other towering figures with whom he met; and his unwavering commitment to peace and non-violence – make the person of the Dalai Lama key to bringing to a close a conflict that has endured for more than 60 years.

Today, I would like to draw attention to some emerging elements in this long conflict and to share with you my serious concern that unless these elements are taken care of, the foundation for any eventual negotiated solution may be lost.

Since I was a fairly young man, I have been privileged to serve His Holiness the Dalai Lama and, in recent years, I have been His Holiness’ chief interlocutor in talks with the Chinese leadership. As a cabinet member of the Tibetan administration in exile and Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, I have also had close interactions with leaders and officials at various levels of governments in different parts of the world. Growing up in India’s environment of freedom and democracy has deeply enriched my thinking, and I have been especially fortunate to know and, in many cases, to work closely with a galaxy of Indian intellectuals and political leaders. Here in the United States, where I have been actively engaged in advancing the Tibet cause for nearly 25 years, I have also had the opportunity to know many scholars, government leaders, and officials who have handled Asia, and specifically China policy. Many of them were kind enough to extend to me their personal friendship and mentoring, such as the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. I have greatly benefited from the wisdom and guidance of many of these fine people. My 30 years of dealing with Chinese leaders, including with members of the Politburo of the Communist Party, has also provided me with first-hand exposure to their views and priorities, and also their concerns.

These experiences have informed my diplomacy on behalf of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and I would like to believe that I have served him and the Tibetan struggle better because of the information and access I have been given. I hope my remarks today will be received in the spirit in which others have shared their insights with me – and as an elder Tibetan diplomat who has lived through these historic times and whose institutional memory is longer than some of those who are less familiar with Tibet yet may be shaping Tibet policy today.

The history of relations between Tibet and China – and between Tibetans and Chinese – is complex and cannot be understood simply in the context of the relatively young People’s Republic of China. This may seem like an obvious assertion were it not for the fact that many of us do not study history sufficiently, and our friends in Beijing seem intent on convincing today’s policy-makers not only that ‘Tibet is an inalienable part of China’ but also that relations with the PRC must be predicated on a notion – incorrectly applied to Tibet – that support for the Tibetan struggle violates the ‘one China’ principle.

The present Tibet-China relationship has its roots in China’s military invasion of Tibet in 1949/50 and in the ‘Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet’ imposed on the Tibetans in 1951.

At this juncture, let me turn to a number of issues that potentially affect policy choices facing governments in Asia, Europe and the United States, as well as those of the Tibetan exile leadership. These correspond with three very serious concerns I have with respect to: international behavior relating to Tibet, the possible direction of Chinese policy with respect to Tibetan autonomy, and the alarming situation in Tibet itself.

First, as I mentioned already, I wish to address a phantom cause for paralysis affecting the ability of some governments to put in place a credible and flexible policy on Tibet and the worsening situation there. This is the well known – but apparently ill understood—‘one-China’ policy invoked by the Chinese government to prevent legitimate inquiry or engagement by members of the international community with respect to Tibet.

The ‘one-China’ policy, as you must know, was created in the early 1970s as the instrument that enabled the United States to establish relations with the People’s Republic of China and maintain relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan.

Then U.S. President Richard Nixon and his national security assistant Henry Kissinger were responding to the Communist Chinese leaders’ need for assurances on U.S. policy with respect to Taiwan when they told Chinese Premier Chou Enlai and Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong that the United States was not pursuing a ‘two-Chinas’ policy. In the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, the United States artfully acknowledged that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait claim that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China… and the United States does not challenge that position.”

This ‘one-China’ policy paved the way for the joint communiqué establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China on January 1st, 1979, and the adoption by the United States Congress of the Taiwan Relations Act that same year. Under the 1979 agreement, the United States recognizes the PRC government as the sole legal government of China, while the Taiwan Relations Act set out the nature of relations the United States would maintain with Taiwan in terms that were not inconsistent with the ‘one-China’ policy but protected the status quo and therefore the status of Taiwan, whatever that might be.

Adherence to the ‘one-China’ policy has been reiterated by successive American Administrations, sometimes making explicit reference to the communiqués mentioned above or to Taiwan’s unchanging status. Although the ‘one China’ policy was articulated in the context of US-China and US-Taiwan relations, Beijing increasingly demands that other governments with whom it establishes or maintains relations also endorse this ‘one-China’ policy.

What is the relevance of this discussion to Tibet? If one has to look for any reference point for China-Tibet relations, it is not the 1972 Shanghai communiqué, but the ‘17 Point Agreement,’ previously mentioned. In fact, the lack of relevance of the ‘one China’ policy is precisely what I would like to address. No Tibetan government has ever claimed to be the government of China, so the application of the ‘one-China’ policy to Tibet – or for that matter, the PRC government’s ‘one China’ principle that stresses the inalienability of both Taiwan and mainland China as parts of a single ‘China’ — simply does not arise.

We have our differences with China’s leaders when it comes to the history of Tibet and our historical independence from China but, as you well know, His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s proposals and statements concerning ways to resolve the Tibetan question all envisage solutions that respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China as the state is constituted today. These proposed solutions call for the exercise by Tibetans of genuine autonomy within the People’s Republic of China and within the framework of its constitution – not for independence.

Yet, the PRC government vigorously pursues efforts to extend the applicability of ‘one China’ to Tibet and, in recent years, it has misled a number of governments into believing not only that the ‘one-China’ policy applies to Tibet, but that it restricts the extent to which their government officials can interact with Tibetan leaders in exile, including His Holiness the Dalai Lama. We believe that the intended effect of China’s initiative is to limit outside governments from playing a constructive role in promoting a mutually acceptable negotiated solution for Tibet. Indeed, by accepting the applicability of ‘one China’ to Tibet, governments are subtly aligning themselves with the Chinese position that the Dalai Lama is trying to ‘split’ China.

While the PRC government is trying to intimidate some governments into believing that meeting with Tibetan exile leaders would violate the ‘one-China’ policy, in reality, this assertion is counter-intuitive to the policy. If there were a connection, the adherence by any government to the ‘one-China’ policy would have the opposite effect. Since the policy was developed precisely to make it possible for the United States to continue to conduct relations with Taiwan while recognizing the PRC government as the sole government of China, if the policy were at all relevant to Tibet, it then should enable governments to conduct relations with the Tibetan exile leadership and His Holiness the Dalai Lama without incurring Beijing’s displeasure.

Ironically for the Chinese assertion, the United States Government actually directs its officials, through the implementation of the Tibetan Policy Act (P.L. 10-228, Sec. 611) to “maintain close contact with religious, cultural and political leaders of the Tibetan people…” Those European and other foreign ministry officials, or their advisors, who uncritically accept Beijing’s opposite argument should do proper analysis before they caution their own political leaders not to cross this non-existent line on Tibet.

Every government has the right to engage with the Tibetan leadership without affecting its solemn adherence to the ‘one-China’ policy and, I would argue, even has the duty – out of self- interest and in the interest of global peace – to promote a peaceful solution to the issue by engaging with both sides in the conflict. With the transfer of power in Dharamsala, it is critical that governments are prepared to look ahead and make policy decisions based on direct relations with the new democratically elected leadership whose authority is derived directly from the Tibetan people in exile and is seen by Tibetans inside Tibet to be derived directly from His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

I need not tell you that Tibet is situated in a strategically important place in Asia, at its very heart between the two largest populations of the world (the Chinese and the Indian), and it shares its remaining border with the Islamic populations of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. One also must not lose sight of the importance of the Tibetan plateau as the ‘third pole’ or the Earth’s third largest store of ice. And, as climate change continues or even accelerates the melting of Tibet’s glaciers, water issues originating in Tibet will have effects that resonate far beyond, impacting both the water supply for billions of people and the atmospheric circulation over much of the planet.

Instability on the Tibetan plateau can therefore have wide ramifications. It should be considered too that the kind of violent extremism we are seeing in other parts of the world is not seen in Tibet where His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the tenets of the Tibetan Buddhist culture — struggling against great odds to survive — have been moderating factors against the destabilizing and potentially dangerous effects of hate propaganda, increasing tensions and economic inequalities between Tibetans and Chinese, and other risk factors in Tibet. Governments and world leaders seen to engage with Tibetans, especially with His Holiness the Dalai Lama, endorse the message that dialogue and non-violence is a laudable path to follow to bring about change. Fear and even refusal to meet with Tibetan leaders sends the opposite signal to those around the world who stand before the choice of whether to pursue their objectives through dialogue and democratic means or through the use of violence. European and other government leaders who wish to stand for non-violent conflict resolution and against the use of deadly force should be mindful of how they demonstrate their convictions and, in the case of Tibet, they should follow the example set by successive U.S. Presidents, Secretaries of State and congressional leaders and stand by His Holiness the Dalai Lama and with the Tibetan people.

Turning to Chinese policies on Tibet, I note with concern the recent article by a person of standing within the Chinese Communist Party advocating the scrapping of the Chinese constitutional provisions and laws on autonomy as they apply to the Tibetans and other nationality minorities within the PRC. This should not be read as an expression of an over-zealous individual’s view. Since some years, a certain academician with strong ties to the Communist Party leadership dealing with the Tibetan issue has also been advocating this view in various forums. It is important to understand the consequences of the implementation of such ideas, for they are considerable.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s proposals and the position of the Tibetan exile administration, supported by many international experts and governments alike, is that the situation in Tibet should be resolved by transforming what is now merely a nominal autonomy for Tibetans under the Chinese constitution and laws into a genuine and effective autonomy. We are convinced that our primary goal of restoring the right of Tibetans to live as Tibetans according to our culture, values and religious traditions can best be achieved if Tibetans can govern themselves under a system of devolution of power from the central government to the Tibet Autonomous Region and its contiguous Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in the People’s Republic of China (where half of all Tibetans live). The international community is increasingly aware of the benefits of decentralization of power and the contribution of autonomy arrangements in the resolution and prevention of conflicts, especially in multi-ethnic states. The autonomy Tibetans are asking for, as set out in detail in the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People that my delegation presented to the Chinese government in our 8th round of dialogue in November 2008, respects the Chinese constitutional framework and is in line with the best practice of states in the area of autonomy.

Instead of supporting the implementation of real autonomy in Tibetan areas within the People’s Republic of China, the proposal I am referring to advocates the opposite position. In the name of promoting Chinese nationalism it calls for eliminating ethnicity and minority status for Tibetans coupled with assimilationist policies, such as requiring that Tibetan children study Chinese culture as the aspirational culture. The policy being advocated is one that negates the distinctiveness of Tibetans and other non-Chinese and would hasten the serious cultural destruction already underway in Tibet.

The recently-concluded session of the Chinese National People’s Congress did not take up these suggestions, but these ideas are dangerous all the same. If these ideas were to lead to changes in the autonomy laws, such a development would have serious ramifications internationally, in Tibet, and for prospects of achieving a negotiated solution to the Tibet question – because it is on the basis on a genuinely autonomous Tibet that His Holiness the Dalai Lama has been able to build a consensus among Tibetans for a future of coexistence with the Chinese.

The international ramifications should be carefully weighed by any Chinese leader contemplating this radical policy move. It is necessary to consider that the recognition by certain governments of China’s claim to Tibet was conditioned through various diplomatic exchanges on the understanding that Tibet’s distinctive identity would be respected as an autonomous area within the People’s Republic of China. Perhaps most important in this regard was India’s demand and China’s explicit assurance, given by Prime Minister Chou Enlai to Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in 1956.

Given India’s proximity to Tibet and its long relations with that country and with China, the Indian government’s position and the assurances given to it by the People’s Republic of China are particularly important because these factors clearly affected the actions and positions of other states whose governments have continued, as has the Government of India, to emphasize the autonomy of Tibet while recognizing it to be a part of the People’s Republic of China. Joint communiqués between India and China make the important distinction when dealing with Tibet of referring to the autonomous status of the Tibetan region. A revocation of Tibet’s autonomy by China or a further dilution of its meaning cannot be taken lightly by these governments and could have serious consequences for China and the region.

What China’s leaders must also realize is that by reneging on the promises of autonomy in the constitution – even if they are unfulfilled – would severely impact the Tibetan position on the question. His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way approach is premised on the supposition that a middle ground between independence and the current centralist dictatorship is possible within the framework of the People’s Republic of China and its constitution. That middle ground is genuine autonomy. If the constitutional basis for autonomy were to be removed from the Chinese constitution and if, therefore, a Middle Way approach could no longer be accommodated within the People’s Republic of China and its constitution, then Tibetans would be compelled to look for a totally different approach.

When we look at the volatile situation in Tibet today, we could well be witnessing a preview of what is yet to come if Tibetans there do not soon experience a considerable, tangible and meaningful change in China’s policies and practices or are at least given a realistic expectation for such change. The terrible and tragic wave of self-immolations in eastern and northeastern Tibet – the Tibetan areas of Kham and Amdo – are unquestionably the direct result of Tibetans living under daily circumstances of oppression. The Chinese government’s failure to grasp the reality of this situation and to act responsibly is of serious concern to many governments.

Prospects for deepening religious repression in Tibet, continuing vituperative attacks against His Holiness the Dalai Lama, constraints on culture, including in the area of Tibetan language use, escalating tensions between Tibetans and Chinese as a result of economic disparities, the yet unknown impact of China’s radical social experiment with nomad settlement – all of these developments forecast an intensification and broadening of the protest movement in Tibet.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama has always called on the people to refrain from using violence and has courageously reached out to China’s leaders over the years. The willful disregard of Chinese leaders to his proposals – and to the plight of the Tibetan people – has placed at risk the peace and stability of Tibet. I do not expect Tibetans to turn to violence as long as His Holiness is present as the symbol of the Tibetan nation and its spirit. However, a continuation of the current level of repression in Tibet – or a worsening of it, which some observers expect—will increase Tibetan resistance, as people feel they have little left to lose.

In circumstances of intense government repression against its own citizens – or of open conflict – the international community has coalesced around the Responsibility to Protect or R2P principle. This principle has been invoked in UN debates on Darfur, Burma, Libya and elsewhere, and the UN has established a framework for its implementation, including the role of early warning. The exercise of sovereignty is a privilege and responsibility that is derived from the will of the people, and it prohibits their abuse. In the case of mass atrocities, the international community has a responsibility to intervene to assist the people and protect them from intolerable harm. Intervention need not be military in nature: that is clearly a measure of last resort.

China, with Russia, has used its veto in the Security Council to block a UN Resolution on Syria that would have embraced R2P as a justification of intervention, claiming the Security Council had no role in the internal affairs of a state. But the People’s Republic of China is not immune to the will of the people it governs or to the condemnation of the international community when it violates international norms of behavior. And Tibetans will inevitably continue to appeal to the international community, despite the major obstacles they may encounter in that endeavor. They have no choice but to do so in the face of the Chinese government’s refusal to address their real and legitimate grievances. The risk factors are in place in Tibet. Unless China’s leaders change their course, with a more responsible approach, I believe that the international community must be increasingly vigilant and prepared to act in a qualitatively different manner to help save Tibet.